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OMNIPRESENT STUDENT SPEECH AND THE SCHOOLHOUSE 
GATE: INTERPRETING TINKER IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
WATT LESLEY BLACK, JR. PH.D.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, school authorities rarely took note of student expression that 
occurred outside of the school setting, but the times have changed. 
Technological advances have broadened the scope and reach of student speech 
in ways that were difficult to imagine twenty years ago. Students are using 
technology to threaten, bully, and harass not only their classmates, but also 
school employees. School administrators face enormous pressure to effectively 
address these issues, but they must also consider the First Amendment rights of 
students when deciding how and when to discipline them for what they say 
online while off campus. 
The United States Supreme Court has provided clear guidelines for dealing 
with student speech on campus. In the landmark 1969 decision Tinker v. Des 
Moines, the Court established that, absent a showing that their speech would 
materially or substantially disrupt school or invade the rights of others, 
students enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.1 In Bethel v. Fraser and 
Morse v. Frederick, the Court carved out exceptions that allow school 
administrators to discipline students for speech that is lewd, vulgar, or that 
advocates the use of illegal drugs.2 But the Supreme Court has yet to deal 
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 1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). This has come 
to be known as the “Tinker Standard” for analyzing student speech. 
 2. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (creating an exception that allows school 
officials to regulate student speech that could reasonably be seen as advocating the use of illegal 
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specifically with electronic student speech that originates off the school 
campus. Therefore, school administrators continue to struggle to appropriately 
balance the school’s interest in safety, order, and discipline against the First 
Amendment rights of students. 
This Article will examine the legal implications of disciplining students for 
cyber-speech that occurs off campus by analyzing recent federal decisions, 
paying particular attention to the issue of whether and how circuit courts have 
been willing to extend the reach of Tinker beyond the schoolhouse gate. 
Section I will outline two Second Circuit cases from 2007 and 2008 that 
required the court to consider Tinker’s applicability to off-campus electronic 
speech. Section II will examine a rift between the judges of the Third Circuit 
that emerged in 2011 as they struggled with the same dilemma. Section III will 
review the most recent decisions from other circuits dealing with off-campus 
cyber-speech and how these circuits handled the Tinker question. Section IV 
will drop to the district level to briefly review how lower courts have applied 
Tinker to off-campus electronic student speech. Section V will pull out 
common threads from the case law in order to highlight critical considerations 
for school administrators who may be facing these issues in practice. 
I.  CYBER-SPEECH AND THE TINKER TEST IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
In 2007, the Second Circuit heard the case of Aaron Wisniewski, an 
eighth-grader who was disciplined for creating an instant message icon with 
disturbingly violent imagery.3 The icon featured a pistol firing bullets into a 
head, punctuated with blood splatters.4 The phrase “Kill Mr. VanderMolen” (a 
reference to Aaron’s English teacher) was inscribed on the image, which 
appeared on the screen as a means of identification whenever Aaron 
communicated with anyone on his “buddy list.”5 The icon was visible for three 
weeks, long enough for one of Aaron’s classmates to give a printout of the 
drawing to the English teacher.6 Distressed, Mr. VanderMolen forwarded the 
information to school authorities, who then alerted law enforcement.7 When 
questioned over the matter by school administrators, Aaron admitted that he 
had created the icon.8 He was suspended for five days, pending a hearing to 
 
drugs); Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (creating an exception allowing school 
officials to regulate student speech that is vulgar or lewd). 
 3. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d. 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 4. Id. at 36. 
 5. Id. Aaron’s “buddy list” comprised around fifteen people, a number of whom were 
classmates. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
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discuss a long-term suspension.9 Mr. VanderMolen, at his own request, was 
relieved of his teaching assignment in Aaron’s English class.10 
Simultaneously, a police inquiry was closed and criminal proceedings 
abandoned after an investigator concluded that that the icon was not a threat, 
but intended as a joke.11 A psychologist interviewed Aaron and concurred with 
the police investigator that he posed no danger.12 Nevertheless, a school district 
hearing officer believed that the image constituted a threat and recommended 
Aaron’s removal from school for a semester.13 After completing his alternative 
placement, Aaron returned to his home school. However, citing a hostile 
environment, the family eventually moved from the district.14 
Aaron and his parents filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the school 
board and the superintendent alleging that Aaron’s speech did not constitute a 
“true threat,” and therefore, it was protected speech under the First 
Amendment.15 They claimed that the school’s actions were in retaliation for 
Aaron’s exercise of a protected right. The district court agreed with the school 
that the icon represented a true threat, granting summary judgment.16 
On appeal, the Second Circuit declined to rule on whether or not the icon 
constituted a true threat and instead chose to examine Aaron’s speech under 
the Tinker standard.17 The Second Circuit’s interpretation of Tinker would 
allow schools to sanction speech in cases where material and substantial 
disruption occurs or can reasonably be forecast to occur, irrespective of where 
the speech originates.18 In splitting with his colleagues, Judge John Walker 
theorized that “a school may discipline for off-campus expression that is likely 
to cause a disruption on campus only if it was foreseeable to a reasonable 
adult, cognizant to the perspective of a student, that the expression might reach 
campus.”19 Judge Walker was advocating an additional prong to Tinker for 
cases involving off-campus speech: a threshold question of reasonable 
foreseeability that the speech would reach the school. Although he was the sole 
advocate of this modified Tinker test, all three judges were in agreement that, 
even if they were to apply the additional prong, the school was still justified in 
disciplining Aaron: “The potentially threatening content of the icon and the 
extensive distribution of it, which encompassed 15 recipients, including some 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 38. 
 18. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. 
 19. Id. at 39 n.4. 
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of Aaron’s classmates, during a three-week circulation period, made this risk at 
least reasonably foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not inevitable,” the court 
explained.20 Once having reached the school, the court concluded 
administration could reasonably predict a heightened risk of a material and 
substantial disruption.21 
A year later, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of off-campus cyber-
speech again.22 Avery Doninger was an eleventh grader at Lewis Mills High 
School in Burlington, Connecticut, and a junior class student council officer.23 
Four days before a student council-sponsored battle of the bands (known as 
“Jamfest”) was scheduled to take place, student council members were 
informed that the teacher who was to run the sound and lights in the newly 
constructed theatre had a conflict.24 Jamfest could not happen in the theatre 
without this particular staff member present. Therefore, the event would have 
to be rescheduled or moved to the school cafeteria.25 Student council members 
worried that rescheduling might cause some of the bands to drop out.26 As an 
alternate venue, the cafeteria was problematic because it did not have an 
adequate sound system and would have forced the bands to perform 
acoustically.27 
Avery and three other students gathered in a school computer lab to write 
an email, which she sent out en masse, alleging that school authorities had 
forbidden the students from holding Jamfest in the new theatre.28 They 
encouraged readers to register their displeasure by calling Superintendent 
Paula Schwartz.29 Both Schwartz and LMHS Principal Karissa Niehoff were 
soon inundated with phone calls and emails regarding the controversy.30 
Niehoff was off campus at a professional meeting and was summoned by 
Schwartz to return to campus where she confronted Avery in the hallway later 
that day.31 Niehoff challenged Avery’s assertion that the school would not 
allow them to use the new theatre and reiterated that the students were free to 
use the theatre on an alternate date.32 She requested that Avery and her friends 
 
 20. Id. at 39–40. 
 21. Id. at 40. 
 22. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 23. Id. at 44. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44–45. 
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send an email correcting the misleading information.33 Rather than heeding 
Niehoff’s counsel, Avery wrote a blog, further expressing her displeasure.34 
Her online editorial included references to certain central office employees as 
“douchebags” and accused them of unilaterally cancelling the event.35 Again, 
she encouraged readers to write to the superintendent to voice their complaints 
in order to “piss her off more.”36 
The next day, the student council met with its faculty sponsor and agreed 
upon a rescheduled date, but Schwartz and Niehoff continued to receive 
complaints even after the issue was resolved.37 It was not until early May that 
Schwartz and Niehoff became aware of Avery’s blog.38 As a result of her 
actions, Niehoff determined that Avery should be disqualified from eligibility 
to run for student council office.39 She explained that Avery’s failure to heed 
her advice “regarding the proper means of expressing disagreement with 
administration policy” played a role in her decision to bar Avery from seeking 
a leadership position within the student council.40 As a write-in candidate, 
Avery still received the most votes, but Niehoff refused to allow her to take 
office, instead naming the second place candidate as the senior class 
secretary.41 
Avery’s mother filed a complaint on her daughter’s behalf with the 
Connecticut Superior Court, claiming that her daughter’s rights under both the 
First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and analogous state law had been 
violated.42 Niehoff and Schwartz successfully had the case moved to the 
federal district court, where Doninger sought and was denied injunctive relief 
to prevent the school from imposing the discipline.43 
On appeal, the Second Circuit chose to apply the Tinker standard to the 
speech, despite the fact that it had occurred off campus.44 It is significant that, 
in this case, the Second Circuit applied the two-pronged framework that was a 
point of disagreement in Wisniewski—adding a test of reasonable 
foreseeability that the speech would reach campus—before considering 
whether Avery’s speech had created a material or substantial disruption.45 
 
 33. Id. at 45. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45–46. 
 38. Id. at 46. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 46. 
 42. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46–47. 
 43. Id. at 47. 
 44. Id. at 48. 
 45. Id. 
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Citing Wisniewski, Circuit Judge Debra Ann Livingston explained that the off-
campus character of student expression “does not necessarily insulate the 
student from school discipline,” especially when it was “reasonably 
foreseeable” that the student expression would ultimately come to the attention 
of the school, and that it would present a risk of material and substantial 
disruption.46 The court found that Avery knew or should have known that her 
blog would come to the attention of school authorities—in essence, she had 
written it with that in mind—targeting both the principal and the 
superintendent directly.47 Further, it was reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s 
online conduct would materially or substantially disrupt the school.48 Her 
public urging of family and friends to contact school authorities and her use of 
offensive language undermined the administration’s efforts to resolve the 
conflict.49 The content of Avery’s posts, Judge Livingston concluded, was 
either misleading or false and contributed to documented threats of a sit-in by 
students who believed that Jamfest had been cancelled.50 In consideration of all 
of these circumstances, Avery’s expression had materially and substantially 
disrupted the school environment. 
Taken together, these two Second Circuit decisions established the 
applicability of Tinker to cases involving off-campus student speech. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, they gave rise to a two-pronged approach to 
Tinker for use in such cases, requiring the school administrator to first consider 
whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach the school 
before assessing its disruptive impact. 
II.  DISAGREEMENT OVER TINKER IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
In the summer of 2009, the Third Circuit applied Tinker to a case involving 
off-campus speech, but not without significant disagreement between the 
circuit judges over whether it was appropriate to do so.51 Both Layshock v. 
Hermitage52 and J.S. v. Blue Mountain involved students who created 
fraudulent MySpace profiles in their principals’ names. Both students were 
subjected to school discipline as a result, and each of them challenged their 
discipline on First Amendment grounds.53 These two cases led to a split within 
the judges of the Third Circuit that is intriguing to say the least, and could 
 
 46. Id. at 50. 
 47. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
 48. Id. at 51. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 295, 308, 311–13, 316 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 52. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 53. Id.; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 295. 
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potentially have ramifications in how future courts handle cases involving 
student cyber-speech that originates off campus. 
J.S. was an honor student at Blue Mountain Middle School in West 
Brunswick, Pennsylvania and had a clean disciplinary record until Principal 
James McGonigle, on two separate occasions, disciplined her for dress code 
infractions.54 Apparently upset over her encounters with school authority, J.S. 
used a home computer to create a fake MySpace profile for McGonigle.55 
Though she did not mention him by name, the site featured McGonigle’s 
picture, which J.S. had misappropriated off of the official school website.56 J.S. 
gave McGonigle the pseudonym “M-Hoe” and described him as being a 
“fagass,” a “sex addict,” and “put on this world with a small dick.”57 Included 
among other implications on the profile was the suggestion that McGonigle 
enjoyed sexual activities with both students and parents.58 
In nearby Hermitage School District, Hickory High School student Justin 
Layshock created a profile of his principal, Eric Trosch, in which he 
lampooned his large physical stature, disparaged his masculine endowment, 
questioned his sexual orientation, and accused him of abusing drugs and 
alcohol.59 Also featuring a photograph that was stolen from the school’s 
website, the profile became well-known among students at the school and 
spawned a small number of copycat sites that were reportedly even more off-
color than Justin’s site.60 
The two cases were heard by separate three-judge panels, each issuing 
conflicting rulings—with the Blue Mountain panel ruling in the school’s favor 
and the Layshock panel ruling in the student’s favor.61 As a result of this 
conflict, the two decisions were vacated and reheard en banc. Ultimately, the 
Third Circuit ruled in both cases that the schools had violated the First 
Amendment.62 
In Blue Mountain, whether and how to apply Tinker was a central question, 
and one on which the Third Circuit was divided.63 Eight of the judges decided 
the school’s actions had violated the First Amendment, but only three relied on 
Tinker in order to make that determination. Judges Michael Chagares, Thomas 
 
 54. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 920–21. 
 58. Id. at 920. 
 59. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 60. Id. at 207–08. 
 61. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 62. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207. 
 63. Synder, 650 F.3d at 936, 941. 
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Amber, and Joseph Greenway applied Tinker, but stopped short of fully 
endorsing it as the standard in such cases. Judge Chagares authored the 
opinion, in which he explained that “[t]he Supreme Court established a basic 
framework for assessing student free speech claims in Tinker” and that it 
would “assume, without deciding, that Tinker applies to J.S.’s speech in this 
case.”64 In a footnoted comment, he acknowledged there was “some appeal” to 
the argument that Tinker only applies to on-campus speech, but explained that 
he “need not address it to hold that the School District violated J.S.’s First 
Amendment free speech rights.”65 In Judge Chagares’s view, the record didn’t 
support their contention that, absent disciplinary action against J.S., material 
and substantial disruption would have occurred.66 “The profile was so 
outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did,” he 
explained.67 Therefore, even under the Tinker standard, the school had acted in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
Judge Brooks Smith wrote a concurring opinion, in which four other 
judges joined, agreeing with the “Chagares Three” that the school district had 
acted illegally.68 Judge Smith differed, however, on the question of whether 
Tinker should apply to off-campus speech: “I would hold that it does not,” he 
wrote, “and that the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-
campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the 
community at large.”69 Justice Smith reasoned that the Tinker holding is tied 
specifically to the “special characteristics of the school environment” and the 
interest of school authorities in maintaining safety and discipline inside the 
schools.70 While he acknowledged that Tinker references student speech “in 
class or out of it,” he contended that when read in context, the phrase refers to 
non-instructional settings at school, such as lunch or recess, and not to speech 
that occurs off campus.71 “Had the Court intended to vest schools with the 
unprecedented authority to regulate students’ off-campus speech,” he argued, 
“surely it would have done so unambiguously.”72 
Judge Smith described a hypothetical situation in which a student posts an 
online editorial in favor of marriage equity, and subsequent to his expression, a 
 
 64. Id. at 926. Note: in A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, Bryan Garner writes that 
presumptions are “more probably authoritative than mere assumptions” and “[p]resumptions lead 
to decisions, whereas assumptions do not.” BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN 
LEGAL USAGE 84 (2d ed. 1995). 
 65. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926 n.3. 
 66. Id. at 928. 
 67. Id. at 930. 
 68. Id. at 936. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 937. 
 71. Id. at 937 n.1. 
 72. Id. 
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significant disruption occurs at school.73 Assuming that Tinker applies to off-
campus speech, Justice Smith suggested, the school could not only punish the 
students who were involved in the disruption, but also the student whose 
expression elicited the disruptive reaction.74 “That cannot be, nor is it, the law” 
he concluded. Judge Smith worried that this would “create a precedent with 
ominous implications,” including the possibility that schools could ultimately 
sanction adult expression within the community.75 
The six dissenting judges saw things quite differently, applying the Tinker 
standard to J.S.’s website and determining that the school was justified in 
taking disciplinary action against her.76 Authored by Judge Michael Fisher, the 
dissenting opinion forcefully maintained that, had McGonigle not taken swift 
action, material and substantial disruption would have occurred: “[s]uch 
accusations interfere with the educational process by undermining the authority 
of school officials to perform their jobs,” explained Judge Fisher.77 He also 
expressed concern that if parents had become aware of the content of J.S.’s 
webpage, district resources would have likely been redirected from the 
educational mission in order to reassure the community of McGonigle’s fitness 
to continue as principal.78 This diversion of resources, he suggested, would 
constitute a material and substantial disruption.79 
Judge Fisher was sympathetic to McGonigle and other educators who 
might find themselves the subjects of disparaging online student speech and 
even cited social science research suggesting that there are “tangible effects” 
on school employees who are the targets of such harassment.80 He pointed out 
that these educators often suffer anxiety and depression and are more likely to 
either leave the profession or lose effectiveness as a result.81 These concerns 
might have proven prescient in McGonigle’s case, as his administrative career 
in Blue Mountain ISD was interrupted during the fall of 2012, when the district 
suspended him without pay following a DUI arrest.82 In addition to the 
suspension, McGonigle was required by the district to enter rehab and 
 
 73. Id. at 939. 
 74. Id. Judge Smith’s hypothetical illustrates a situation often referred to as the “Heckler’s 
Veto,” in which the government stifles protected speech as a result of actual or anticipated 
disruptions from those who disagree with the speaker’s point of view. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 733–34 (2000). 
 75. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 939. 
 76. Id. at 941, 945–46 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 945. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 946. 
 80. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 946. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Stephen J. Pytak, Blue Mountain Middle School Principal Accepts District Suspension, 
REPUBLICAN HERALD, (Sept. 29, 2012), http://republicanherald.com/news/blue-mountain-mid 
dle-school-principal-accepts-district-suspension-1.1380517. 
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participate in anger management sessions after it was reported that he resisted 
the arresting officer.83 When he returned to Blue Mountain Middle School in 
January of 2013, McGonigle offered a contrite statement to the community that 
was posted on the district’s website in which he acknowledged having 
exercised “terrible judgment” that led to his arrest and attributed it to grief over 
the death of a close family member.84 Whether or not McGonigle’s personal 
and professional troubles were in any way related to the stress of J.S.’s 
webpage and the ensuing legal battle is merely speculation, but it is an 
interesting development in light of Judge Fisher’s dissenting opinion. 
In the Layshock case, the applicability of Tinker was not an issue. The 
school district argued that, by taking Trosch’s picture off the school website, 
Justin had entered school property, thus making it a case of on-campus, rather 
than off-campus speech.85 The school also offered the theory that they could 
punish Justin based upon the Fraser exception for lewd or vulgar speech.86 The 
court rejected both arguments.87 The school did not contend that Justin’s 
speech had caused a substantial or material disruption; therefore, the court did 
not have to address the question of whether or not Tinker should apply to off-
campus speech.88 
Though the Tinker question was not directly addressed in Layshock, the rift 
between the judges did bubble to the surface in a concurring opinion authored 
by Judge Kent Jordan, in which he was joined by Judge Thomas Vanaskie 
(both members of the Blue Mountain dissent).89 Judge Jordan unambiguously 
asserted his arguments in favor of applying Tinker to off-campus speech and 
his objections to Judge Smith’s Blue Mountain concurrence, particularly 
criticizing what he viewed as an inappropriate focus on the physical location of 
the speaker.90 “For better or worse,” he explained, “wireless internet access, 
smart phones, tablet computers, social networking services like Facebook, and 
stream-of-consciousness communications via Twitter give an omnipresence to 
speech that makes any effort to trace First Amendment boundaries along the 
 
 83. Id.; Stephen J. Pytak, Blue Mountain Principal Charged with DUI, REPUBLICAN 
HERALD, (Sept. 8, 2012), http://republicanherald.com/news/blue-mountain-middle-school-princi 
pal-charged-with-dui-1.1369878. 
 84. Statement from James McGonigle to Blue Mountain School District Community (Jan. 
11, 2013), available at http://www.bmsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Statement-by-James-
McGonigle.pdf. 
 85. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 86. Id. at 216. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 219. 
 90. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 221. 
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physical boundaries of a school campus a recipe for serious problems in our 
public schools.”91 
The split within the court makes any analysis of Blue Mountain a tricky 
exercise. In sum, three judges assumed that Tinker extends off campus and 
then relied upon it to strike down the school action.92 Six others fully endorsed 
the application of Tinker to off-campus speech and used it to uphold the school 
district’s actions.93 Another five judges declared that Tinker should never apply 
to off-campus speech.94 So while it can accurately be said that a majority of 
Third Circuit judges extended Tinker’s reach off campus, it should not be 
forgotten that three members of that majority applied Tinker through an 
assumption, as opposed to an actual finding of applicability. 
TABLE 1: THE THIRD CIRCUIT BLUE MOUNTAIN SPLIT95 
 Judge  Did the School Violate 
the First Amendment? 
Does Tinker Apply to Off-
Campus Speech? 
Michael Chagares Yes Assumed yes, without deciding 
C.J. Theodore McKee Yes No 
Dolores Sloviter Yes No 
Thomas Ambro Yes Assumed yes, without deciding 
Julio Fuentes Yes No 
Brooks Smith Yes No 
Thomas Hardimann Yes No 
Joseph Greenaway Yes Assumed yes, without deciding 
Michael Fisher No Yes 
Anthony Scirica No Yes 
Marjorie Rendell No Yes 
Kent Jordan No Yes 
Thomas Vanaskie No Yes 
Maryanne Barry  No Yes 
 
 91. Id. at 220–21. 
 92. See Judge Chagares’ opinion, in which he is joined by Judges Ambro and Greenaway. 
Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920, 926, 931 (3d Cir. 
2011), with id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 93. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 941–52 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 94. See id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 95. See id. at 920, 941. 
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III.  APPLYING TINKER IN OTHER CIRCUITS POST-BLUE MOUNTAIN 
In 2011, shortly after the Third Circuit issued its opinions in Blue 
Mountain and Layshock, the Fourth Circuit weighed in on the issue of off-
campus student cyber-speech.96 Kara Kowalski was a senior at Musselman 
High School in Berkeley County, West Virginia.97 In December of 2005, Kara 
created a MySpace group called “S.A.S.H,” which targeted a classmate named 
“Shay” for harassment. Kara invited approximately one hundred of her 
classmates to join “S.A.S.H.,” which was an acronym for “Students Against 
Shay’s Herpes.”98 The same day that Kara created the page, students began to 
upload content.99 One of the first images to appear on the page was a 
photograph of two boys holding their noses while displaying a sign that read 
“Shay Has Herpes.”100 Among other photographs that appeared on the site was 
a digitally altered picture of Shay with the phrase “[e]nter at your own risk” 
imposed over her crotch.101 Students were able to add comments to the page, 
many of which were derogatory towards Shay.102 
Shay, along with her parents, arrived at the school the following morning 
to file a complaint.103 They met with an assistant principal who would later 
investigate the complaint along with Principal Ronald Stephens.104 In the 
meantime, Shay left school with her parents, not feeling comfortable attending 
classes that day.105 Stephens consulted with the central office and conducted an 
investigation which included meetings with Kara as well as other students who 
had posted comments on the website.106 Ultimately, Stephens concluded that 
Kara had violated the school policy on “harassment, bullying, and 
intimidation” and issued a ten-day out-of-school suspension accompanied by a 
“social suspension” of ninety days.107 The social suspension meant that Kara 
would be barred “from attending any school-related events in which she was 
not a direct participant.”108 In addition, Kara was removed from the 
cheerleading squad for the remainder of the year and barred from participation 
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in the “Charm Review.”109 Ironically, as the reigning “Queen of Charm,” Kara 
would have had the responsibility of crowning her replacement.110 
Kara’s parents challenged the school’s actions, arguing that the 
punishment unnecessarily isolated her from her peers, adversely impacted the 
treatment she received from faculty and staff, and contributed to a 
depression.111 The Fourth Circuit found Tinker to be the controlling standard: 
“[T]he language of Tinker,” the court explained, “supports the conclusion that 
public schools have a ‘compelling interest’ in regulating speech that interferes 
with or disrupts the work and discipline of the school, including discipline for 
student harassment and bullying.”112 With regard to the issue of the speech 
occurring off campus, the court took an interesting approach, raising the 
“metaphysical” question of whether or not Kara’s speech should even rightly 
be considered to have occurred off campus.113 Kara may have “pushed her 
computer’s keys in her home,” the court explained, “but she knew that the 
electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home and 
could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the school 
environment.”114 The court even suggested that if Kara’s speech could rightly 
be considered to have occurred on campus, it could also be regulated under 
Fraser.115 Ultimately, however, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the same two-
tiered version of Tinker that the Second Circuit developed in Wisniewski—a 
reasonable foreseeability that the speech would reach the school environment 
coupled with a reasonable foreseeability that when it did, a material and 
substantial disruption of the school environment would result.116 
Clearly, the court believed that Kara knew her webpage would reach the 
school community—and they also believed that, due to the “harassing 
character” of the speech, the disruption that ensued was substantial. “[T]he 
creation of the ‘S.A.S.H.’ group forced Shay N. to miss school in order to 
avoid further abuse,” Judge Niemeyer pointed out, “[m]oreover, had the school 
not intervened, the potential for continuing and more serious harassment of 
Shay N. as well as other students was real.”117 
On August 1, 2011, the Eighth Circuit also weighed in on the issue of off-
campus cyber-speech, issuing a decision supporting school discipline of a 
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student who sent threatening instant messages during non-school hours.118 In 
the fall of 2006, D.J.M. was a sophomore at Hannibal High School in 
Hannibal, Missouri. One afternoon, he was at home engaging in a chat session 
with a female friend.119 During the chat, D.J.M expressed his desire to bring a 
gun to school and named specific students whom he wanted to kill.120 The 
friend expressed concern to a trusted adult about the content of D.J.M.’s 
messages.121 She explained that D.J.M. had told her that he had access to a 
gun, that he wanted to “shoot everyone he hates,” that he was suicidal and on 
multiple medications, and that he wanted Hannibal High School to be “known 
for something.”122 D.J.M.’s chat partner and her adult confidant shared this 
information with Principal Darren Powell, who contacted Hannibal 
superintendent Jill Janes.123 They immediately alerted the police, who went to 
D.J.M.’s home and took him into custody later that same evening.124 He was 
placed in juvenile detention before being referred and eventually admitted into 
a psychiatric hospital.125 
D.J.M was initially suspended for ten days but the suspension was soon 
extended for the remainder of the year.126 His parents challenged the 
disciplinary action via the district’s appeal process, but the Hannibal School 
Board unanimously upheld the suspension, at which point the parents took the 
district to court.127 The district court granted summary judgment to the school 
on the First Amendment claim, finding that D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true 
threat and was therefore unprotected by the First Amendment.128 Additionally, 
the district court found that the “disruptive impact” of D.J.M.’s speech justified 
the school district intervention, even though the speech occurred off campus.129 
D.J.M. and his parents appealed the grant of summary judgment to the 
Eighth Circuit, claiming that he had not expressed a serious intent to harm 
anyone, and that because the speech had occurred off campus that it was not 
within the bounds of the school’s authority.130 The district’s primary argument 
was that D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true threat.131 The district also claimed 
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its actions were defensible under the Tinker standard.132 Citing the 
considerable time that school administrators had to spend alleviating the safety 
concerns of stakeholders as a result of D.J.M.’s expression, the circuit court 
agreed with the district court’s conclusion that a substantial disruption to the 
school environment had occurred, therefore justifying the school’s actions 
under the Tinker standard.133 
The Eighth Circuit relied heavily on its 2002 decision in Doe v. Pulaski in 
examining the issue of whether or not D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true 
threat.134 “Doe defined a true threat as a ‘statement that a reasonable recipient 
would have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause 
injury to another’ . . . . ‘if the speaker communicates the statement to the object 
of the purported threat or to a third party.’”135 D.J.M. asserted that his 
expressions were meant as jokes and were nothing more than venting of teen 
angst prompted by the goading of his chat partner. The Eighth Circuit rejected 
that contention, pointing out that he had “mentioned suicide in connection with 
a potential school shooting” and “identified a specific type of gun he could use 
and listed a number of specific individuals he planned to shoot.”136 The court 
concluded that these factors, “[c]ombined with his admitted depression, his 
expressed access to weapons, and his statement that he wanted Hannibal ‘to be 
known for something,’” were adequate to satisfy the Doe true threat test.137 
In October of 2012, the Eighth Circuit revisited the issue in S.J.W. v. Lee’s 
Summit.138 In this particular case, twin high school brothers had created a blog 
with the expressed purpose to “discuss, satirize, and ‘vent’ about events” at 
their high school.139 The blog contained racist language and discussions 
regarding violent incidents that had occurred at school.140 Additionally, there 
were sexually graphic comments about female students who were identified by 
name on the posts.141 An investigation quickly led school authorities to the 
Wilson brothers, who were issued ten-day suspensions, which were later 
converted to 120-day reassignments to an alternative campus.142 The Wilsons 
challenged the school’s actions in federal district court, seeking an injunction, 
claiming that they would suffer irreparable harm if they were forced to attend 
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the alternative school and denied the opportunity to take the advanced 
academic and fine arts offerings at their home school.143 The Western District 
of Missouri sided with the Wilsons and issued an injunction preventing the 
school from imposing the consequences on the boys.144 The school district 
appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which reversed the decision of the district 
court.145 
The district court had determined that the Wilsons had a likelihood of 
success on the merits, but the Eighth Circuit disagreed, citing their own 
decision in D.J.M. The court also cited Doninger, Wisniewski, and Kowalski as 
examples of other circuits applying Tinker to off-campus student expression. 
The court pointed out that the majority of the Third Circuit in Blue Mountain 
followed Tinker, even though three of the judges had only assumed that it 
applied.146 J.S. had prevailed in her challenge against Blue Mountain Middle 
School because her parody of McGonigle was not materially or substantially 
disruptive, unlike the Wilson brothers’ blog.147 Based upon this, the Wilsons 
were “[u]nder Tinker . . . . unlikely to succeed on the merits,” and were denied 
injunctive relief.148 
In late August 2013, the Ninth Circuit became the most recent appeals 
court to tackle the issue of off-campus student cyber-speech with Wynar v. 
Douglas County School District.149 The case involved Landon Wynar, who 
was a sophomore at Douglas High School in Douglas County, California.150 
Landon, an avid gun collector, regularly communicated with his friends via 
instant messaging.151 His favored chat topics included his guns, shooting, 
World War II, and the heroic attributes of Adolph Hitler.152 As his sophomore 
year progressed, his messages became increasingly violent.153 He wrote in 
detail about his plan to engage in a school shooting on April 20th of that year, 
the anniversary of both Columbine and Hitler’s birthday.154 He made specific 
references to his guns and ammunition and expressed a desire to set a record 
for body count.155 Landon’s friends became more and more alarmed by his 
messages until they confided to one of their coaches at the high school, who in 
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turn notified the principal.156 Landon was suspended pending a formal hearing 
and expulsion.157 Along with his father, he sued the district, including 
administrators and trustees, alleging a First Amendment violation.158 The 
district court granted summary judgment to the school district, and Landon and 
his father appealed to the Ninth Circuit.159 
In her opinion, Ninth Circuit Judge Margaret McKeown briefly referenced 
the findings of other circuits, noting the inherent complexity in determining the 
proper standard in such cases: “One of the difficulties with the student speech 
cases is an effort to divine and impose a global standard for a myriad of 
circumstances involving off-campus speech,” she explained.160 Ultimately, 
Judge McKeown applied Tinker, but not before distinguishing the character of 
Landon’s speech from the speech at issue in Blue Mountain, pointing out that 
“[a] student’s profanity-laced parody of a principal is hardly the same as a 
threat of a school shooting, and we are reluctant to try and craft a one-size fits 
all approach.”161 By making such a distinction, Judge McKeown narrowly 
endorsed Tinker as the standard for threatening student speech, while leaving 
the question open as to whether it would apply in all circumstances.162 Judge 
McKeown concluded, “[W]hen faced with an identifiable threat of school 
violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus 
speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”163 
Landon’s expression, in the court’s view, unquestionably met the 
requirements of Tinker.164 The “alarming and explosive” nature of the 
messages, reasoned the court, made it reasonable for the school district to 
interpret them as a real safety risk.165 In the view of the court, Landon’s 
fascination with previous school shootings, access to weapons, and the details 
he expressed about his plan made it prudent for the district to take the 
messages seriously, even if he had intended them as jokes.166 His clean prior 
disciplinary record was unpersuasive to the court, as Judge McKeown pointed 
out that according to U.S. Department of Education statistics, two-thirds of 
school gunmen had clean disciplinary records prior to their shootings.167 
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In the wake of the Blue Mountain holding, the decisions from these three 
different circuits are both interesting and informative. Each of the decisions 
endorsed the notion of Tinker’s application to off-campus speech. As a group, 
all three decisions provide helpful context on what courts are likely to consider 
a material and substantial disruption in terms of off-campus speech. Both 
D.J.M. and Wynar underscore the willingness of judges to support school 
administrators responding to reasonably threatening speech. However, Wynar 
distinguishes “threatening” off-campus expression as inherently different from 
off-campus speech that is merely offensive, profane, or derogatory, and holds 
open the question of whether Tinker should apply to the latter. 
IV.  REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURTS’ APPLICATION OF TINKER TO OFF-CAMPUS 
SPEECH 
The discussion in this Article has principally been limited to federal circuit 
court cases, but it should also be noted that over the last fifteen years, a number 
of district courts have applied Tinker in cases involving off-campus student 
cyber-speech. As was illustrated in the Third Circuit’s decision in Blue 
Mountain, however, analysis of off-campus student speech under Tinker does 
not necessarily guarantee that school disciplinary action will pass 
constitutional muster. A review of these district court cases demonstrates that, 
even when analyzed under Tinker, off-campus student speech is less likely to 
be viewed by the courts as materially and substantially disruptive than speech 
that occurs on campus. 
In 1998, a federal district judge in Missouri applied the Tinker test in a 
case that involved a student who was suspended after creating a webpage that 
was critical of his school’s administration.168 Student Andrew Beussink 
composed the webpage from his home, where a friend using his computer saw 
it and in turn shared it with school authorities.169 Beussink was first suspended 
for five days, but after further consideration, Principal Yancy Poorman 
lengthened the suspension to ten days.170 Though the court held that Tinker did 
apply, it still granted Beussink an injunction.171 In ruling against the school, the 
court reasoned that the webpage had not created a material or substantial 
disruption and that Principal Poorman had disciplined Beussink purely for the 
content of his speech.172 
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In western Pennsylvania in 2001, a federal district court sided with a 
student who emailed a “top ten” list disparaging the district’s athletic director 
to select friends.173 Although the student, Zachariah Paul, intended his list to 
reach only a limited audience, one of his friends reformatted the email, printed 
hard copies, and distributed it at school.174 The list soon turned up in the 
teachers’ lounge, and predictably, Zachariah found himself facing school 
disciplinary measures.175 The court applied Tinker, but found that the “top ten” 
list did not satisfy the test of material or substantial disruption.176 Two years 
later, the same district court again ruled in favor of a student who was kicked 
off the volleyball team after posting critical comments about an art teacher 
online.177 The court found that the district code of conduct’s prohibition of 
“inappropriate, harassing, offensive, or abusive” speech was unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it allowed the school district to punish students for non-
disruptive speech in violation of Tinker.178 
In 2009, a central California federal district court ruled against a school 
district that suspended an eighth grade girl (J.C.) who posted a video of herself 
and friends “talking smack” about a classmate (C.C.) on YouTube.179 The 
video was shot after school and uploaded that evening from J.C.’s home 
computer.180 That evening, J.C. contacted C.C. and let her know that the video 
was on YouTube.181 J.C. offered to remove the video from the site, but C.C. 
declined at the urging of her mother, who wanted to ensure that the video 
would be online and available for viewing by school authorities the next 
day.182 C.C. was still in distress when she arrived at school the following 
morning, but after a 20–25 minute session with the counselor, she was able to 
successfully return to class for the day.183 The court applied Tinker but found 
that the video did not cause a disruption sufficient enough to merit school 
disciplinary action.184 
Most recently, in a southern Florida case, Federal Magistrate Judge Barry 
Garber denied a school principal’s motion for qualified immunity after being 
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sued by a high school student who was disciplined for posting a Facebook page 
that was critical of one of her teachers.185 The page was created from the 
student’s home, contained no threatening language, and was removed after 
only two days.186 In the process of finding that the student had a clearly 
established constitutional right at stake, Judge Garber applied the Tinker test to 
the fact circumstances and held that the speech did not cause a material or 
substantial disruption at school.187 
As of this writing, no district court has yet seized upon the Smith 
concurrence from Blue Mountain, which argued that Tinker should never apply 
to off-campus student speech. In 2011, however, a federal district judge in 
Indiana adopted the language of “assumption” utilized by Judge Chagares in 
Blue Mountain and “assumed without deciding” that Tinker applies to off-
campus speech.188 Despite applying Tinker, the district court ruled in favor of 
high school girls who were challenging their discipline after posing for risqué 
photos at an off-campus slumber party and then posting them online.189 It is 
worthy to note that the judge viewed both the taking of the pictures and the 
posting of them to be separate acts of expression that are protected under the 
First Amendment.190 Any disruption that ensued, according to the court, was 
nothing more than “petty” disagreements between team members and did not 
rise to the level of a material or substantial disruption.191 
In contrast to the above-referenced decisions, a 2012 decision from the 
Northern District of Mississippi provides an interesting example of off-campus 
speech that was deemed sufficiently disruptive to the school to justify 
disciplinary action.192 A Mississippi high school student recorded a rap song 
featuring vulgar language, racial epithets, and accusations aimed at two high 
school coaches.193 The words also suggested that the coaches had engaged in 
sexual contact with female students and included the ominous sounding line 
“going to get a pistol down your mouth.”194 The student made the video 
available to his 1300 Facebook friends, and posted it on YouTube, where it 
was available to the general public.195 Citing the potentially threatening and 
intimidating lyric as well as the breadth of its distribution, the court held that it 
was foreseeable that the song would indeed create a material and substantial 
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disruption to the school environment.196 These district court decisions highlight 
that while there is a consensus that Tinker is the applicable standard for 
evaluating student speech whether it occurs on campus or off campus, there is 
less consensus on exactly what constitutes a material and substantial 
disruption. It is apparent, however, that the standard of material and substantial 
disruption, when applied to off-campus speech, can be a difficult one for 
school administrators to meet. 
V.  KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
In a forum where students regularly and publicly voice dissent with or 
disdain for school policies, practices, and people, how should well-intended 
principals recognize and react to off-campus electronic student speech that is 
actually or potentially disruptive to the school? How can they protect their 
students and their staff members from cyber-bullying and harassment while 
still respecting the First Amendment rights of students? This section will 
suggest some key questions and considerations for school administrators who 
face these issues in practice. 
A. Reasonable Foreseeability That the Speech Would Reach the School 
A fairly stable consensus has emerged in the case law that Tinker can 
appropriately be applied to off-campus student speech. Therefore, the same 
guiding question should dictate administrative action in all student speech 
cases: did the student expression in question cause a real or nascent material or 
substantial disruption? However, this is not the only question school 
administrators should ask when dealing with cases involving off-campus 
student cyber-speech. Before analyzing the real or potential disruptive impact 
of student speech, it is advisable for administrators to pause and consider 
whether or not a student should have reasonably known that his speech would 
come to the attention of the school. 
The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits all considered the question of the 
reasonable foreseeability that a student’s off-campus speech would reach the 
school before extending Tinker to off-campus speech. The Third Circuit, 
however, did not consider this question. A two-tiered Tinker test for off-
campus expression is a more conservative approach in making disciplinary 
decisions and shows greater deference to the First Amendment rights of 
students. As one legal scholar explains: 
Because the first step of the Wisniewski inquiry provides additional protection 
for students whose off-campus expression could not reasonably have been 
foreseen to reach the school environment, it is likely that the Third Circuit 
approach will permit more schools to discipline students for off-campus 
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expression in the future; in contrast, the Second Circuit approach would likely 
uphold a student’s free speech rights given similar facts, despite the particular 
outcomes in Wisniewski, Doninger, and J.S. IV.197 
Consider, for example Porter v. Ascension, a Fifth Circuit decision from 
2004 in which a student had drawn a sketch depicting his school under a 
violent attack.198 He made the drawing at home and kept it in a sketchbook in 
his closet.199 Two years later, his younger brother found the sketchbook and 
took it to school.200 The drawing was discovered and the artist was identified 
and punished.201 The Fifth Circuit ruled in the child’s favor, finding that he did 
not intend, nor could he reasonably have foreseen, that the drawing would ever 
be taken to the school.202 It is duly noted that Porter involved a more 
traditional form of student expression, and it is difficult to imagine similar 
circumstances involving electronic speech. 
When evaluating the foreseeability that the speech would reach the school, 
administrators should consider how the student shared the content. Did he post 
it on a site that was accessible to the public or members of the school 
community? Did he send it to members of the school community via email or 
other types of messaging services? Did he talk about or access the content at 
school, or did he encourage others to do so? 
It could be argued that whenever a student posts online, he or she knows 
(or should know) that his expression might eventually be shared with members 
of the school community. It is not beyond the realm of possibility, however, 
that a student would communicate electronically in a way that he reasonably 
expected would remain private or confidential; and through no fault of his 
own, the content was disseminated to school authorities or the wider school 
community. In such a situation, under the two-pronged Tinker test, the school 
would have no legal justification for discipline and there would be no need to 
proceed to the question of disruption. If, however, there was a reasonable 
foreseeability that the student’s speech would reach the campus, the school 
administrator may then turn to an analysis of the real or potentially disruptive 
impact of the speech. 
B. Disparagement of School Employees Has Low Disruptive Potential 
Disparaging or disrespectful remarks directed at school employees are 
commonly grounds for discipline when they occur in the classroom, on 
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campus, or at school activities. Generally, the supporting rationale for 
disciplining students in these circumstances is that such expression undermines 
the authority of school employees and their ability to maintain discipline 
within the school environment. It is questionable whether that rationale would 
equally apply to off-campus speech. 
Consider the principal in Blue Mountain, McGonigle, who felt unfairly 
targeted by J.S.’s MySpace profile. He was angry and embarrassed by its 
content. Had he not taken swift and certain disciplinary action against J.S., he 
likely reasoned a material and substantial disruption would have resulted. 
Parents might have seen the profile, his reputation may have been tarnished, 
and his fitness to continue as principal may have been scrutinized. Further, a 
failure to discipline J.S. would have undermined his authority and encouraged 
other students to engage in similar behavior. Had J.S. made her comments in 
the school setting, this rationale would have certainly been sufficient to justify 
taking disciplinary action. But the Third Circuit viewed J.S.’s profile as absurd, 
unlikely to be seen as authentic by any objective reader. Nothing in the record 
indicated that any adult in the community had seen the profile and taken it 
seriously. The disruption that occurred as a result was essentially limited to the 
time that administrators spent investigating—an activity that is routine in the 
daily life of a school administrator. McGonigle’s feelings of anger and 
embarrassment, while unpleasant, did not rise to the level that would constitute 
a material or substantial disruption of school, nor was it reasonable to forecast 
such a disruption. 
In the Doninger case, by contrast, the Second Circuit determined that, as a 
result of Avery’s email and blog post, both the superintendent and the principal 
of the school had been overwhelmed with phone calls from angry and 
concerned parents. Principal Niehoff had to leave an off-campus meeting to 
return to campus and attend to the controversy. Even after the issue had been 
resolved to the satisfaction of all parties, the administrators continued to 
receive phone calls. Student unrest was high, and there were threats of 
demonstrations. Considering all this, the court felt that the school had 
demonstrated satisfactorily that a material and substantial disruption had been 
the result of Avery’s off-campus expression. 
In sum, when a student engages in off-campus speech that disparages a 
school employee, school administrators should objectively evaluate the impact 
of the speech. Was the expression widely seen and believed by members of the 
school community? Was the fitness of the employee brought into question? 
Did the employee’s performance suffer as a result of the speech? Did the 
expression generate unrest within the school community that required a 
significant redirection of district time or resources? Was the content widely 
accessed by students at school? Unless an administrator can answer 
affirmatively to one of more of these questions, or document circumstances 
suggesting that such would be the case absent disciplinary action, it is unlikely 
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that disparaging remarks directed at school employees would meet the standard 
of material and substantial disruption. 
C. Disparagement of Students Has High Disruptive Potential 
Generally speaking, speech that targets students has a high potential for 
serious disruption. Online bullying or harassment can often cause students to 
have problems academically or socially at school, and in many cases can cause 
students to miss school entirely. The Fourth Circuit’s Kowalski decision 
highlights that the only way for Shay to escape the harassment of her 
classmates was to stay home. This was a determinative factor in the court’s 
decision. School administrators should keep in mind, however, that while 
courts have been more likely to uphold school disciplinary action for off-
campus electronic speech that targets a student, there are no guarantees. Recall 
that in J.C. v. Beverly Hills, the court did not see evidence of a material and 
substantial disruption despite the fact that a student was the target of the online 
video. The targeted student returned to class and functioned well for the rest of 
the day after only a short session with her counselor. 
Administrators should objectively consider the impact of the speech both 
on the targeted student and on the school community in general. Was the 
speech widely accessed by students at school? Does the “target” suffer a 
decline in school performance or participation as a result of the speech? Does 
he or she experience problems with peers or increased anxiety at school as a 
result of the speech? Does the speech inspire other students to tease or harass 
the targeted student? Was the content of the speech so provocative that it 
resulted in disruptive or violent confrontations between students at school? If 
there are affirmative answers to any of these questions, or if an administrator 
can document circumstances suggesting that a failure to take disciplinary 
action would lead to these types of problems, there is a strong case for 
disciplinary action. 
It bears mentioning that laws regarding bullying vary from state to state, 
and it is important for school administrators to be aware of and to follow their 
state laws and local policies regarding bullying. Unfortunately, when it comes 
to cyber-bullying, which frequently occurs off campus, state laws might not 
always provide a great degree of guidance. In fact, fewer than half of the states 
specifically address cyber-bullying in their statutes.203 
D. Threats to Students or Employees Have the Highest Disruptive Potential 
When student cyber-speech crosses the line from harassing to threatening, 
then there is a high potential for disruption. Recall the messages sent to a 
 
 203. Sameer Hinduja & Justin Patchin, State CyberBullying Laws, CYBER BULLYING RES. 
CTR. (July 2010), http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf. 
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friend by D.J.M., in which he referenced bringing a gun to school and shooting 
specific individuals. When the school was made aware of the content of 
D.J.M.’s messages, it caused officials enough alarm that they were forced to 
make significant adjustments to the school’s security protocols and 
communicate those changes to parents. Additionally, once community 
members had learned of the threats, it was reasonable to forecast that major 
anxiety within the community would ensue. In the Eighth Circuit’s view, this 
met the test of material or substantial disruption.204 
The First Amendment does not protect true threats and in many cases they 
are criminally prosecutable. Not all speech that might be construed as 
threatening, however, constitutes a true threat. The Eighth Circuit concluded 
that D.J.M.’s instant messages met their standard for true threats—a “statement 
that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression of an 
intent to harm or cause injury to another…if the speaker communicates the 
statement to the object of the purported threat or to a third party.”205 
Theoretically, the school could legally sanction a student who makes a true 
threat, irrespective of whether or not it caused a disruption. Truly threatening 
speech directed at students or staff, however, will almost always give rise to 
material and substantial disruption, especially if unaddressed by school 
authorities. If a school administrator can clearly make the case that a student 
has engaged in a true threat, then he or she will likely have multiple legally 
defensible grounds to justify disciplinary action. The law surrounding true 
threats is murky, however, and varies from circuit to circuit. Therefore, when 
assessing student speech that might be threatening, school administrators 
would be wise to consult with local law enforcement officials or school district 
attorneys. 
It is also prudent to consider that, while it bolsters the case for discipline 
when speech meets the test for a true threat, speech need not qualify as a true 
threat in order to merit discipline. Remember that the Second Circuit in 
Wisniewski and the Ninth Circuit in Wynar upheld school disciplinary action 
based upon Tinker, without considering whether the speech qualified as a true 
threat. In fact, the Ninth Circuit endorsed something akin to an “airport 
security” mentality, suggesting that even if messages were intended as jokes, 
the school was reasonable in treating them seriously. 
E. “Undifferentiated Fear or Apprehension” of Disruption Is Not Enough 
School administrators who impose discipline without careful consideration 
of the impact of student speech, irrespective of where it occurs, run the very 
real risk of invoking the Heckler’s Veto, unconstitutionally silencing student 
 
 204. D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 205. Id. at 762. 
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speech based upon real or anticipated negative reactions of those who may 
disagree with the speaker’s point of view. Justice Fortas warned in Tinker that 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” is not a sufficient reason 
for school administrators to sanction student expression.206 As he eloquently 
explained: 
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates 
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. 
But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is 
this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our 
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow 
up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.207 
The hypothetical raised by Third Circuit Judge Smith in the Blue Mountain 
case, in which students react to an online editorial advocating marriage equity, 
is illustrative of this potential pitfall for school administrators seeking to apply 
the Tinker guidelines in practice, particularly in cases dealing with off-campus 
speech. In Judge Smith’s scenario, the onus would be upon the school to 
adequately address the behavior of the heckler, underscoring the principle that 
the robust exchange of ideas, including those with which one does not agree, is 
part of the educational experience. 
Finally, a word of caution—while all the circuits dealing with off-campus 
electronic student speech have relied upon Tinker, only five circuits have 
actually heard such cases. The Third Circuit’s reliance on Tinker might be 
described as tenuous in consideration of the deep divisions between the circuit 
judges. The Ninth Circuit applied Tinker narrowly to student speech that 
threatens violence and left the question of whether it applies to other forms of 
off-campus student speech unanswered. The fact that there is technical 
agreement between the circuits on this issue may have, at least so far, 
dissuaded the Supreme Court from stepping into the fray.208 However, future 
cases involving off-campus cyber-speech must be watched closely by the 
community of legal scholars. It is possible that other judges will begin to adopt 
the language used by Third Circuit Judge Michael Chagares, “assuming, but 
not deciding” that Tinker’s reach extends to off-campus speech. It is also 
possible that other jurisdictions will begin to embrace the rationale expressed 
by Third Circuit Judge Brooks Smith that speech occurring off school property 
is generally beyond the reach of school discipline. Perhaps the recent opinion 
of Ninth Circuit Judge McKeown, which advocated different standards for 
different types of student expression, will influence future decisions. What is 
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certain is that, as long as students communicate electronically, schools will 
continue to struggle with how to balance their First Amendment rights against 
the need for safety, order, and discipline. Should future cases create 
disharmony between the circuits, it will increase the likelihood that the 
Supreme Court will ultimately have the last word on this issue. 
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